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BASEBALL’S DNA TESTING POLICY STRIKES OUT:
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Shannon K. Stevens

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

The New York Yankees signed shortstop Damian Arredondo on
1
July 3, 2009. The sixteen-year-old switch hitter from the Dominican
Republic garnered an $850,000 signing bonus, and in return he
promised a strong arm and speed—“he reportedly ran a 60-yard-dash
2
in 6.4 seconds.” The problem is that Damian Arredondo is not six3
teen years old. In fact, his name is not Damian Arredondo. Soon after the team signed him, a Major League Baseball (MLB) investiga4
tion revealed that he lied about his identity and his age. The
5
Yankees subsequently voided his contract, and he is now a free agent.
Such stories are common. Other MLB franchise teams have
likewise been the victims of identity fraud by international players,
6
particularly players from the Dominican Republic. Since the United
∗
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2008,
Birmingham-Southern College. I thank my Mom and Dad for their love and support. I also thank Professor Bernstein for her thoughful commentary and Sarah
Greers for her technical assistance.
1
Yankees Notes, N.J. RECORD, July 3, 2009, at S05, available at 2009 WLNR
14510300.
2
Melissa Segura, Source: MLB Nixes Yanks’ Signing of Player with Fraudulent Identity,
SI.COM (July 17, 2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/baseball/mlb/
07/16/yankees.signing/index.html.
3
Id.
4
Kevin Baxter, The Shortcuts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at C1, available at 2009
WLNR 18644708.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Paul Hoynes, Tribe Paid $750,000 to Impostor, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 19, 2009, at D5, available at http://www.cleveland.com/tribe/plaindealer/
index.ssf?/base/sports/1253349237110300.xml&coll=2 (covering the investigation of
Cleveland Indians player Jose Ozoria who had claimed to be seventeen years old but
who was actually twenty-year-old Wally Bryan); Mark Zuckerman, The Final Countdown?, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at C01, available at 2009 WLNR 3858470 (reporting that Washington Nationals’s sixteen-year-old Esmailyn Gonzales, who had received a $1.4 million signing bonus, had falsified his identity; it was later discovered
that the player was actually Carlos David Alvarez Lugo and four years older than
claimed).
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States began requiring stricter document verification after September
11, 2001, 540 major and minor league baseball players were identified as lying about their identity or falsifying their age to make them7
selves appear younger. Most of these cases involve players from the
8
Dominican Republic, but likely no one would suggest Dominican
players are undeserving of the opportunity to play major league baseball. The country is known for its proliferation of great baseball play9
10
ers. “[B]aseball is a natural resource for the Dominican Republic,”
and stars including Sammy Sosa, David Ortiz, and Manny Ramirez
11
hail from the country. Regardless, teams are growing more guarded
when recruiting international players. For example, the Cleveland
Indians recently contemplated requesting DNA tests for all incoming
12
international players who sign for over a $50,000 bonus. The Indians’ Director of Scouting, John Mirabelli, noted that “it’s more ex13
pensive, but . . . we want to be as precise as we can be.”
In all probability, the age and identity problem will not soon dis14
appear. MLB teams pay high salaries to their top players. In 2009,
for example, the New York Yankees had a total payroll of over $200
15
million and paid their players an average of $5 million each. MLB
rookies can be awarded as much as $500,000 in starting salary with
16
equally high signing bonuses.
Dominican prospects, unlike U.S.
17
and Canadian players, are not subject to a draft. Dominican sports
agents, called “buscóns,” recruit and train young players and then

7

Baxter, supra note 4.
See id.
9
See Charles S. Farrel, Time for MLB to Play Hardball, BASEBALL REFLECTIONS (Aug.
30, 2009) http://baseballreflections.com/2009/08/30/time-for-mlb-to-play-hardball.
10
Id.
11
See id.
12
Hoynes, supra note 6.
13
Id.
14
In a recent development, MLB insiders revealed that the organization is considering establishing a youth baseball league in the Dominican Republic. Michael S.
Schmidt, Baseball Considers Plan to Curtail Age Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at B11,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/sports/baseball/10baseball.html.
The plan could involve an MLB-run pipeline for Dominican talent and include a finger printing system to keep track of youth players. Id.
15
See
Major
League
Baseball
Salary
Database,
USA
TODAY,
http://content.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/salaries/default.aspx (last visited Aug.
23, 2010).
16
Michael S. Schmidt & Alan Schwarz, Baseball’s Use of DNA Raises Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/
sports/baseball/22dna.html.
17
Baxter, supra note 4.
8
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negotiate contracts and signing bonuses on the players’ behalf. The
19
buscón can receive up to half of the bonus as compensation. Because money and fame accompany young, talented players, age and
identity fraud are unfortunately common, especially as Dominican
players have the additional pressure of a greedy buscón.
In a written statement, MLB announced that it would be requesting DNA samples from Dominican prospects on a consensual basis to
20
address the age and identity fraud problem. Some franchise teams
have gone one step further in requiring DNA tests for all internation21
al recruits. In the past, Dominican players have found others willing
to lend a younger child’s birth certificate for the player to submit as
22
proof of age. Similar to the widely publicized controversies involving players in the Little League World Series—and in contrast to
Women’s Olympic Gymnastics—it is far more beneficial for a pros23
pective player to appear younger than older. Using DNA samples,
MLB’s Office of Investigations can determine whether the parents
listed on the birth certificate are in fact the biological parents of the
player and consequently, whether the office should further question
24
the age of the prospect. Thus, the investigation is essentially into
the paternity and maternity of the individuals listed on the birth certificate.
Alarmingly, scouts and commentators have speculated that MLB
is keeping and testing DNA samples to determine a player’s suscepti25
bility to disease and injury. MLB has declined to say whether it
26
keeps the samples. The scouting director for one team stated that
he was not sure whether the MLB could test for susceptibility to cancer, but “[he knew] they’re looking into trying to figure out suscepti18

Id.
Id.
20
Alan Schwarz, A Future in Baseball, Hinging on DNA, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at
B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/sports/baseball/23dna.html.
21
See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
22
Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16.
23
See Bill Pennington, Baseball; No Sliding in Little League: No Papers, No Tournament, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at D5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/
06/25/sports/baseball-no-sliding-in-little-league-no-papers-no-tournament.html?
pagewanted=all; Juliet Macur, Teeny-Tiny Matter of Age for China’s Gymnasts, N.Y. TIMES,
August 9, 2008, at SP6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
08/10/sports/olympics/10age.html.
24
See Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16.
25
Id.
26
Jesse Sanchez, MLB, Clubs Using DNA Tests on Prospects, MLB.COM (July 22,
2009, 3:05 AM),http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090722&content_id=
5993474&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp.
19
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27

bility to injuries.” Such a practice, while unverified, conjures up unsettling images reminiscent of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World or the
28
1997 movie GATTACA.
Genetic information contains a wealth of data about a person.
Humans, indeed all living things, contain cells—the basic units of
29
life. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the source of genetic informa30
tion, is found in each cell. Long strands of DNA intertwine with the
31
help of proteins to form chromosomes. DNA represents the instruc32
tions for operating the cell and has two primary functions. The first
33
is to code for making proteins. Cell machinery “reads” DNA and
manufactures amino acids, which are subsequently strung together to
34
form the proteins making up the tissues and organs of the body.
The second function of DNA is to copy the instructions for reproduc35
tion and delivery to offspring. To accomplish this vital task, cell machinery again “reads” the DNA, makes a copy of it, and stores it in
36
sperm or egg cells.
Mistakes in the DNA, called “mutations,” can cause disease.
Where the DNA contains a mutation, cell machinery may make the
37
wrong protein, make too much of it, or fail to make it altogether.
Such problems with protein synthesis can cause disease or increase
38
one’s chances of developing disease. For example, amyotrophic lat39
eral sclerosis (ALS or “Lou Gehrig Disease”) is a motor neuron dis40
order that causes random weakness, muscle atrophy, and cramps.
Death, which in a majority of cases occurs within three years, often

27

Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16.
See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper Perennial Modern Classics
2006) (1932); GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
29
James Evans et al., Genetics, in SCIENCE FOR LAWYERS 175, 178 (Erik York Drogin
ed., 2008).
30
Id.
31
STUART M. BROWN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF MEDICAL GENOMICS 18 (2003).
32
Evans et al., supra note 29, at 180.
33
Id. at 182.
34
BROWN ET AL., supra note 31, at 18.
35
Evans et al., supra note 29, at 185–86.
36
Id. at 186.
37
Id. at 188.
38
Id.
39
This disease was made famous when baseball great Lou Gehrig was diagnosed
with ALS. ATLAS OF PATHOPHYSIOLOGY 116 (H. Nancy Holmes ed., 2002). One cannot help but ask this question: would the Yankees have continued to start Gehrig if
they knew he was predisposed to ALS?
40
MERCK MANUAL 1897–98 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 18th ed. 2006).
28
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results from the failure of respiratory muscles. ALS has multiple
42
contributing causes, one of which is a mutation in DNA.
Genetic testing can reveal these mutations, and herein lies the
43
danger; MLB teams use the DNA test to determine paternity. A genetic test is a broad term, but it could include a test that analyzes
44
DNA, RNA, genes, or chromosomes. With this information, the tester can determine what diseases the subject has or might one day de45
46
velop. Importantly, DNA does not encode for age. As we age, our
47
chromosomes become more susceptible to damage, but no genetic
test can tell an investigator that the owner of a particular sample of
48
DNA is twenty years old. Accordingly, any genetic testing MLB requires—ostensibly to determine a player’s age—will necessarily reveal
genetic information other than age and will be incapable of determining the player’s age directly.
After receiving media attention, the MLB DNA testing policy has
come under fire, and commentators are raising questions concerning
49
its ethical implications and legality. This Comment addresses the
wide range of ethical and legal issues arising from the policy. It concludes that the MLB policy skirts the bioethical line unnecessarily.
Not only does MLB face strong potential for a legal battle, it faces,
50
and already has faced, judgment in the public sphere. Most importantly, good old-fashioned detective work and less invasive medical
procedures, such as a bone scan, are a much less controversial way to
51
discover and prevent age and identity fraud.
Part II of this Comment will summarize genetic discrimination
and how, in the context of sports, it raises an interesting problem be-

41

Id.
ATLAS OF PATHOPHYSIOLOGY, supra note 39, at 116.
43
Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16.
44
See, e.g., MICHELE SCHOONMAKER & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, GENETIC TESTING:
SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND AND NONDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 9 (2006).
45
Id. at 10.
46
There is no particular gene or set of genes for age as there might be for brown
hair and blue eyes. While a genome will likely sustain greater damage as the individual ages, there is no genetic test for age. See generally ROBERT ARKING, THE BIOLOGY OF
AGING: OBSERVATIONS AND PRINCIPLES (3rd ed. 2006).
47
Id. at 368.
48
See supra note 46.
49
See supra text accompanying notes 23–26.
50
For discussion relating to the potential legal battle see infra Part IV. For discussion relating to public scrutiny see supra notes 25–28.
51
See infra Part IV for a discussion of alternatives to a DNA test that do not raise
liability issues.
42
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cause professional sports teams depend directly on the health of
players for success. Part III will discuss the applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and why this Act does not provide an
adequate remedy in this specific context. Part IV is a comprehensive
overview of Title II of the recently enacted Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and its possible application to the
MLB DNA testing policy. Finally, Part V provides an overview of state
laws addressing genetic discrimination and specifically reviews the
New York genetic discrimination statute.
II. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND THE CURIOUS PROBLEM OF
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETICS
Genetic discrimination is not a new phenomenon. Early examples involved discrimination based on phenotype (the physical ma52
nifestation of a genetic trait) and sought to purify or discriminate
among the population’s ethnic or racial makeup. The federal government established the Eugenics Records Office in 1910; its mission
was to collect genetic data to ensure that marriages would be suitable
53
based on various genetic criteria. Passed in the form of immigration
restrictions, a 1924 federal act limited the entry of Southern and
54
Eastern European immigrants. President Calvin Coolidge, who previously said “America must be kept American,” quickly signed the Act
55
into law.
States also had a hand in the genetic discrimination pervasive in
the early 1900s. Many states passed sterilization laws targeting racial
minorities, immigrants, and institutionalized individuals. Pennsylvania’s law, entitled the “Act for the Prevention of Idiocy,” authorized
the sterilization of “feebleminded” children for whom procreation
56
was inadvisable as determined by state institution surgeons. The
“Indiana Plan” intended to address crime and degenerate classes of
57
humanity by requiring vasectomies—a simple outpatient procedure.
In 1927, the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s forced sterilization
52

Early genetic discrimination, if merely based on phenotype, would not involve
modern genetic testing such as a DNA test. For one of the first instances of modern
genetic profiling see Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable ‘Minisatellite’ Regions in Human
DNA, 314 NATURE 67 (1984).
53
Id. at 100.
54
DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USE OF HUMAN
HEREDITY 97 (1985).
55
Id.
56
EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO
CREATE A MASTER RACE 66 (2003).
57
ELOF AXEL CARLSON, THE UNFIT: A HISTORY OF A BAD IDEA 247 (2001).
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laws, declining to strike down the program on either Fourteenth
58
Amendment due process or equal protection grounds.
59
Decades later, sickle-cell-anemia screening programs began.
60
These programs, which by default targeted African Americans, iden61
tified carriers of the disease. Scientists suggested at the time that
healthy carriers might be particularly susceptible to toxins such as
62
benzene, lead, cadmium, carbon monoxide, and cyanide. Not surprisingly, employers began testing for the sickle-cell-anemia gene
based on this theory to single out those employees that might be sus63
ceptible to workplace toxins. Because the practice led to widespread
stigmatization and discrimination against carriers, Congress ultimately passed the National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act in 1972, which
withholds federal funds from states unless sickle-cell-anemia testing is
64
voluntary.
It is no wonder then that fears developed over the acquisition
and use of genetic information, especially in the context of employment. The breadth of information provided leaves an individual feel65
ing particularly vulnerable and apprehensive about its use. A 1997
national telephone survey found that when asked whether the respondent would take a genetic test if insurers or employers had access
66
to the results, sixty-three percent said no. In 2004, a John Hopkins
University study similarly found that less than ten percent of those
surveyed believed that employers should have access to genetic in67
formation. A report by the Department of Labor, the Department
of Health and Human Services, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cited a study of just under one thousand people
that identified two hundred cases of genetic discrimination, as well as
58

Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200 (1927).
Melinda B. Kaufmann, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview of Existing Protections, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 393, 402 (1999).
60
JUDY MONROE PETERSON, SICKLE CELL ANEMIA 6 (2009).
61
Kaufmann, supra note 59, at 402.
62
Katherine Brokaw, Comment, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employers’
Liability, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 317, 323 (1990).
63
Kaufmann, supra note 59, at 402–03.
64
Id.
65
See Erin D. Williams et al., Genetic Discrimination: Overview of the Issue and Proposed Legislation, in GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 13 (Leana J. Albertson ed., 2008) (explaining the impact of the fear of discrimination on behavior).
66
NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE
WORKPLACE 1 (1998), available at http://www.genome.gov/10001732.
67
GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., JOHN HOPKINS UNIV., REPRODUCTIVE GENETIC
TESTING: WHAT AMERICANS THINK 43 (2004), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/
pub.reports.php?action=detail&report_id=6.
59
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a study that identified five hundred people who were denied insurance or employment on the basis of a genetic predisposition to dis68
ease. The fears underlying these statistics stem from the idea that
an individual’s genetic data can be arbitrarily and maliciously used to
discriminate against a person when seeking insurance or employment. The findings illustrate that receipt of another’s genetic profile
opens up a Pandora’s Box of information especially susceptible to
69
abuse.
But genetic discrimination in the context of professional sports
raises a more complex issue. While many jobs require general wellbeing, there is not a strong emphasis on a single employee’s perfor70
mance, and success is not closely tied to physical ability. For example, although an employee may have asthma or sickle-cell-anemia, her
condition would not normally prevent her from being a successful
lawyer, doctor, or teacher.
This is not the case, however, in the context of professional
sports. A professional baseball player’s success, much less his career,
depends on his physical well-being. In a sense, health is a legitimate
and necessary job qualification, and employers must consider it to
protect themselves and the employee from harm. Paul Trumble argues that “the influence of athlete-employees differs from the influence of ordinary employees in two key interrelated respects—
heightened organizational and financial dependence of the sports
71
employer on the athlete-employee.” Furthermore, these teams rely
on a small number of athletes and depend almost exclusively on the
72
employees’ health for financial success. Thus, the arbitrariness and
insidiousness that often characterizes employment discrimination is
not necessarily present in the professional sports context.
Even though health may seem like a legitimate job qualification
for a professional athlete, genetic testing is still extremely problemat68

H.R. Rep. No. 110-28, pt. 3 at 27 (2007).
But see Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Genetic Discrimination, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1463 (2001) (suggesting that the evidence provided by such studies is too anecdotal to adequately describe the extent
and nature of genetic discrimination).
70
For a discussion of the number of employees in an organization affecting the
success of the organization see Paul D. Trumble, “Knickel” and Dime Issues: An Unexplored Loophole in New York’s Genetic Discrimination Statute and the Viability of Genetic Testing in the Sports Employment Context, 70 ALB. L. REV. 771, 789 (2007).
71
Id. at 788.
72
Id. at 789; see also Rich Coutinho, The 2009 Mets: A Year of Misery, Injury, and Instability,
NEW
YORK
SPORTS
(Dec.
29,
2009,
12:10
PM),
http://thestarryeye.typepad.com/nysports/2009/12/the-2009-mets-a-year-of-miseryinjury-and-instability.html.
69
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ic because of the possibility that genetic information will be used in
irrelevant or inappropriate ways. Take as an example the circumstances surrounding former Chicago Bulls center Eddy Curry. Curry
began experiencing heart discomfort during March of 2005 and underwent testing by cardiologists who confirmed the structural sound73
ness of his heart. He was, however, diagnosed with athletic tachycardia, or “athlete’s heart,” which is a condition that develops when
74
significant amounts of physical exertion over time enlarge the heart.
Despite the fact that the first set of cardiologists cleared him to play,
the Bulls sought the opinion of another cardiologist who suggested
Curry might be susceptible to developing hypertrophic cardiomyopa75
thy—a rare but potentially deadly condition. When the Bulls insisted that Curry take a DNA test, Curry refused; although he did secure a six-year, $56 million contract with the Bulls, he was traded to
76
the New York Knicks. It is doubtful anyone would argue that Curry’s
career as a professional basketball player would not be in jeopardy if
77
he were found to have severe heart problems. Ultimately, although
Curry was able to sign a long-term contract, it is disturbing that the
Bulls pressed the issue after Curry successfully passed a battery of
tests. In short, the DNA test was invasive because it was unnecessary.
Despite the curveball that professional athletics throws into the
genetic discrimination discussion, it is still a contentious issue, and its
victims deserve legal protection. Merit-based decisions in employ78
ment have long been a goal of federal legislation. The discussion
that follows will address efforts to provide legal redress for the discriminatory use of genetic information in the employment context,
which many fear the new MLB policy will encourage.

73

Michael A. McCann, Professional Sports and Collective Bargaining: The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational Analysis of the NBA Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 819, 819–20 (2006).
74
Id. at 847.
75
Mark Starr, Sports: To Play or Not to Play, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 2005, at 13, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/50690.
76
Marc J. Spears, Curry Plays on Despite Questions, DENVER POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at
D01, available at 2005 WLNR 18672354.
77
See also Ian Thomsen, Change of Heart, Pro Leagues Should Make a Common Cardiac Test Mandatory, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 31, 2005, at 26, available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1106568/index.htm
(discussing whether NBA teams should require testing to discover potential heart
abnormalities in the wake of the death of Atlanta Hawks player Jason Collier).
78
One example is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). Another example is the Americans with Disabilities
Act discussed in Part III of this comment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
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III. INADEQUACY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO
REMEDY GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
The Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted to eliminate
79
discrimination against individuals based on disability. Title I of the
ADA specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in
80
employment. The claim of genetic discrimination in the workplace,
however, has not proved a good fit for litigation under the ADA.
Specifically, a genetic predisposition to disease may not fall within the
Act’s definition of a disability. Also, genetic testing by an employer
may escape scrutiny under the Act’s restrictions on pre-hiring medical examinations and disability-related inquiry. These barriers prevent the ADA from providing adequate protections to victims of genetic discrimination in employment.
As a threshold matter, in order to qualify for protection under
81
the ADA, the claimant must have a disability. The statute defines
disability in three ways. First, the ADA defines it as a “physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life ac82
tivities.”
Although the actual manifestation of a genetic disease
would be considered a disability if substantially limiting a major life
83
activity, the predisposition to that genetic disease does not fit within
the literal definition because it does not amount to a manifested im84
pairment.
The second definition of disability is “a record of such an im85
pairment.” This category covers individuals who have a history or
record of impairment or who have been misclassified as having an
86
impairment. But here again, a claimant’s mere disposition provides
no history, record, or misclassification.

79

Id.
Id. §§ 12112–12117.
81
§ 12112(a).
82
Id. § 12102(1)(A).
83
See, e.g., Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 94 F.3d 96,
98 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that Down Syndrome, a genetic disease, is a disability under the ADA).
84
J.H. GERARDS ET AL., GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND GENETIC PRIVACY IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 154 (2005); Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us Disabled Individuals Under the Americans With Disabilities
Act?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 613, 620 (1997); Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Genetic Defect Is a
Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Preventing Genetic Discrimination by
Employers, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 112 (1992).
85
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B).
86
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2010).
80
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Finally, the ADA protects as disabled those individuals who are
87
“regarded” as having an impairment. This definition provides the
most promising avenue for individuals who have a predisposition to
genetic disease. The Code of Federal Regulations subdivides this definition into three further categories. The first category includes individuals with impairments that do not substantially limit major life
88
activities but are treated by the employer as having such limitations.
In the second category, the individual has an impairment that substantially limits activities only as a result of the attitudes of others to89
wards such impairment. In the third, the individual has none of the
impairments but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantial90
ly limiting impairment.
With respect to the third category, only the employer’s perception and treatment are at issue, and thus, an individual with a predisposition to a genetic condition could have a qualifying disability that
91
is afforded the protections of the ADA. The interpretive guidance
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) supports this notion. It states that the third definition of disability “applies to individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis
92
of genetic information.” Additionally, in 2000 President Clinton issued an executive order prohibiting genetic discrimination in federal
93
employment consistent with the EEOC guidance. But this order
does not address private or state employment and is made under the
executive’s vague authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
94
executed” granted by Article I of the Constitution. Furthermore,
the seemingly favorable EEOC guidelines may have persuasive au95
thority but are not binding. Importantly, courts have not, and likely
will not, consider predisposition to a disease a disability under the

87

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1).
89
Id. § 1630.2(l)(2).
90
Id. § 1630.2(l)(3).
91
GERARDS ET AL., supra note 84, at 156; Dichter & Sutor, supra note 84, at 620.
92
3 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.8
(1995).
93
Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000).
94
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
95
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“We consider that the
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment.”).
88
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96

ADA. The Supreme Court has also narrowly interpreted “disabili97
ty.” And although Congress ultimately rejected the Court’s narrow
construction by amending the ADA, it did not include any provision
in the amendments that defined genetic predisposition as a disabili98
ty —likely because of the impending consideration of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act. Thus, it is unlikely that a claimant with a mere genetic predisposition could demonstrate a disability under the ADA.
Genetic testing may also escape scrutiny under the ADA’s restrictions on pre-hiring medical examinations and disability-related inquiries. These provisions state that “a covered entity shall not conduct a
medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to
whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the
99
nature or severity of a disability.” It is acceptable, however, to “make
preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform
100
job-related functions.” Additionally, and most significantly, once an
offer of employment is made, the entity can require a medical examination and may condition the offer on the result of this examina101
tion under three conditions: (1) all incoming employees must be
subjected to the examination; (2) the information obtained must be
collected and maintained on separate and confidential forms; and
(3) the results of the medical examination must be used in accor102
dance with the ADA.

96

William J. McDevitt, I Dream of GINA: Understanding the Employment Provisions of
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 54 VILL. L. REV. 91, 104–05
(2009); see Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment,
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 837, 837–38 (2008).
97
See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197–99 (2002)
(finding the respondent who claimed that her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her carpal tunnel syndrome did not have a disability under the ADA by reasoning that Congress intended that the element of disability be a high bar), superseded by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. (2)(b)(4), (5), 122
Stat. 3553, 3554; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 507 (1999) (finding
that the petitioner who was diagnosed with myopia did not have a disability under
the ADA and adopting an “understanding that those whose impairments are largely
corrected by medication or other devices are not ‘disabled’ within the meaning of
the ADA”), superseded by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec.
(2)(b)(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
98
See sec. 5, § 102, 122 Stat. at 3557 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112
(Supp. II 2008).
99
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2006).
100
Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
101
Id. § 12112(d)(3).
102
§§ 12112(d)(3)(A)–(C).
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Administrative regulations complement the language of the
medical examinations provision. The Code of Federal Regulations
provides that an entity “may make pre-employment inquiries into the
ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions, and/or may
ask an applicant to describe or to demonstrate how, with or without
reasonable accommodation, the applicant will be able to perform job103
related functions.”
The EEOC Compliance Manual defines a prohibited “disability-related inquiry” as one “that is likely to elicit infor104
mation about a disability.”
Relevant examples provided by the
EEOC of prohibited conduct include asking an employee to provide
medical documentation regarding a disability; asking an employee’s
co-worker, family member, or other person about the employee’s disability; and, significantly, asking about an employee’s genetic infor105
mation.
Further, the EEOC makes clear that this provision is not
limited in application to qualified individuals with a disability, but rather that “the ADA’s restrictions on inquiries and examinations apply
106
to all employees, not just those with disabilities.”
Nonetheless, this provision of the ADA may also fail to provide
adequate protections. The statutory language allows employers to extend a bona fide conditional job offer and then to subsequently deny
employment to individuals whose disabilities are discovered during a
107
post-offer exam.
The Ninth Circuit dismissed just such a medical
examination-based claim—where an employer retracted an offer after
108
a medical exam—in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkley Laboratory.
The plaintiffs voluntarily agreed to submit blood and urine samples
after the employer made offers conditional upon a medical examination; however, the plaintiffs were unaware that the employer was test109
ing for sickle cell anemia, syphilis, and pregnancy. The court held
that “the ADA imposes no restriction on the scope of entrance examinations; it only guarantees the confidentiality of the information gathered and restricts the use to which an employer may put the infor110
mation.”

103

29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (2010).
2 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL §
915.002 (2000).
105
Id.
106
Id. (emphasis added).
107
Jan W. Sturner, Preemployment Medical Exams Under the ADA, 50 ARK. L. REV. 449,
452 (1997).
108
135 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1997).
109
Id. at 1265.
110
Id. at 1273.
104
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Although the case eventually settled, EEOC v. Burlington Northern
Santa Fe Railroad provides an example of a genetic discrimination
111
In 2001, the
claim that may have been viable under the ADA.
EEOC sought a preliminary injunction to require the Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railroad to end genetic testing of employees filing
112
work-related injury claims. The workers claimed that they were required to submit blood samples, but they were not told of or asked to
consent to genetic testing for a chromosome deletion that leads to
113
some types of carpal tunnel syndrome.
Apparently, the company
believed (erroneously) that this test could demonstrate that the car114
pal tunnel syndrome was genetic rather than work-related.
One
employee, George Avary, claimed that the company had threatened
115
disciplinary action after he refused to provide a blood sample. The
EEOC took the position that the genetic testing violated the ADA,
specifically the restrictions under § 12112(d) on medical examinations and inquiries, because the examination was not “job related and
116
consistent with business necessity.”
In April of 2001, however, the
117
EEOC settled with the railroad. The agreement called for the railroad to cease directly or indirectly requiring its employees to submit
samples for genetic testing; to refrain from analyzing any blood samples that it already possessed; to refrain from evaluating, analyzing, or
considering any genetic analysis previously performed on an employee; and to refrain from retaliating or threatening adverse action
against employees opposed to genetic testing or those who took part

111

EEOC v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., No. 01-4013 (N.D. Iowa filed Feb. 9,
2001).
112
Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Petitions Court to
Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad Workers in First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic
Testing Under Americans with Disabilities Act (Feb. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-9-01-c.html.
113
Id.
114
Dr. Phillip Chance, the creator of this particular genetic test, was disturbed by
reports that the company had employed it in this manner because it was designed to
uncover a disease that rarely causes carpal tunnel syndrome. See Patricia A. Roche,
The Genetic Revolution at Work: Legislative Efforts to Protect Employees, 28 AM. J.L. & MED.
271, 276 n.36 (2002).
115
Tamar Lewin, Commission Sues Railroad to End Genetic Testing in Work Injury Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/02/10/us/commission-sues-railroad-to-end-genetic-testing-in-work-injurycases.html?pagewanted=1.
116
Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, supra note 112.
117
Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., No. 01-4013 (N.D. Iowa April 18, 2001) (order
granting preliminary settlement agreement).
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118

in the EEOC proceedings. This case could have potentially opened
the door to inclusion of genetic discrimination under the ADA. Unfortunately, no factfinder considered the case, and the ADA has yet to
emerge as a key protection against genetic discrimination.
A pre-employment medical examination, however, would likely
yield only information relevant to the possibility of disease, not evidence of a manifested disability, and thus would not violate the
119
ADA.
An employer could use medical information obtained to
screen out genetically predisposed job applicants as long as the disease or condition could not reasonably be accommodated and “the
exclusionary criterion is job-related and consistent with business ne120
cessity.” While this policy contravenes the requirement that all entering employees be subject to an examination if the employer wishes
to condition an offer of employment on the results of a medical ex121
amination, the results are nonetheless being used in accordance
with the provisions of the ADA. That is, a court will probably not
consider the examination to be inquiring into a disability, and the
court will thus convert what would otherwise be a clear violation under the ADA into an acceptable activity because the Act would no
longer apply. Unlike in Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, MLB is
not testing for evidence of a genetic disorder that has already manifested symptoms. Therefore, the DNA testing policy is unlikely to fall
within the ADA restrictions on employer medical examinations.
IV. BASEBALL’S DNA TESTING POLICY VIOLATES THE GENETIC
INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT
A. Background and Legislative History
In an effort to cure the apparent inadequacies of the ADA in the
context of genetic discrimination, Congress passed the Genetic In122
formation Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in 2008. Broadly, GINA
provides protections against the discriminatory use of genetic infor118
Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Settles ADA Suit
Against BNSF For Genetic Bias (Apr. 18, 2001), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
press/4-18-01.html.
119
See supra text accompanying notes 103–105. Again, even if a preemployment
examination caused an employer to treat the employee as having a genetic predisposition, the protections of the ADA would not be triggered. See supra text accompanying notes 90–98.
120
GERARDS ET AL., supra note 84, at 165.
121
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) (2006).
122
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–
2000ff-11 (Supp. II 2008).
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mation by both health insurers and employers.
Congress recognized that advances in the sequencing of the human genome have
provided major opportunities for medical progress, genetic testing,
124
and individual awareness of susceptibility to disease and treatments.
Such advances, however, give rise to “the potential misuse of genetic
125
information to discriminate in health insurance and employment.”
To support the legislation, Congress provided examples of this misuse citing sterilization laws, sickle cell anemia screening programs,
and pre-employment genetic screenings such as the ones at issue in
126
Norman-Bloodsaw and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad.
Additionally, both the House and Senate reports demonstrated a
concern with preserving privacy of genetic information and the associated fear of its misuse. For example, the House report noted,
“[t]he value of genetic information . . . is personal to individuals, who
may choose to utilize this information to help guide . . . life deci127
sions.”
Moreover, the lack of complete information about the underlying genetic and environmental components of diseases and their
relevance to patient care make regulation of the area difficult for pol128
icy makers. But regardless of the incomplete scientific understanding of genetic science, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions concluded that fears of discriminatory treatment are
129
not hypothetical.
The Committee listed surveys and statistics demonstrating that employers currently or have in the past used genetic
130
information to make hiring and firing decisions. With these problems in mind, the Senate report states that the protections provided
by Title II of GINA (addressing the area of employment) are meant
131
to mimic those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The testimony of the sponsors of the bill and others in Congress
demonstrates this intention. For example, Representative Slaughter
of New York, who introduced the bill, described it as the “first civil

123

See id. § 2.
Id.
125
Id. at § 2(1).
126
Id. §§ 2(2)–(4); see also supra Parts II–III.
127
H.R. Rep. No. 110-28, pt. 3, at 26 (2007).
128
Id.
129
S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 1 (2007).
130
Id.; see also supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. Further, employees do
not have recourse under the ADA. See supra Part III.
131
S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 27 (2007).
124
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132

rights legislation of the 21st century.” She too provided anecdotal
evidence of genetic discrimination and associated fears: a North Carolina woman was fired after a genetic test revealed a lung disorder
even though the disorder was being successfully treated; an adoption
agency refused to allow a woman at risk of developing Huntington’s
disease to adopt a child; and numerous university studies that have
133
identified fear of the use of genetic information by employers.
B. Statutory Language and Proposed Rules
Title II of GINA states in relevant part that it is unlawful for an
employer to “fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or
otherwise to discriminate against any employee” on the basis of ge134
netic information.
Also, an employer is prohibited from requesting, requiring, or purchasing the genetic information of an employee
or family member of the employee, except for a few delineated statu135
tory exceptions. “Employee” has the same definition as provided in
the Civil Rights Act and thus includes any applicant for employ136
ment.
A genetic test is one that analyzes human DNA, chromo137
somes, or mutations. The term “genetic information” includes genetic tests of the individual, genetic tests of a family member, and the
manifestation of a disease or disorder of the individual or a family
138
member. But relevant to the current discussion, the term “genetic
information” explicitly excludes information about the age of an in139
dividual.
In November of 2010, the EEOC issued final rules for publica140
In discussing the regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations.
tions corresponding to Title II of the Act, the EEOC offered interpre141
tation of the purpose, definitions, and prohibitions in the Act.
“Title II of GINA prohibits use of genetic information in the employment context, restricts employers and other entities covered by

132
154 Cong. Rec. H2956, H2956 (2008) (statement of Representative Louise
Slaughter).
133
Id. at H2957.
134
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008).
135
Id. § 2000ff-1(b).
136
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006).
137
§ 2000ff(7)(A).
138
Id. § 2000ff(4)(A).
139
Id. § 2000ff(4)(C).
140
Regulations under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75
Fed. Reg. 68912 (Nov. 9, 2010).
141
Id.
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Title II from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information, and strictly limits such entities from disclosing genetic informa142
tion.” The adopted regulations reaffirm that both the use of genetic information to make hiring decisions and the acquisition of
143
genetic information are prohibited under GINA. More importantly, the regulations make clear that “[g]enetic tests include . . . DNA
144
testing that reveals family relationships, such as paternity.”
C. The DNA Testing Policy Violates GINA
Two primary motivations exist for an MLB franchise team to request a DNA test from a prospective player. The first purpose is to
prevent age fraud. The second purpose is to determine whether a
player is susceptible to disease or injury. Whether or not MLB and
franchise teams are acting with this second purpose is mere speculation; however, it is the fear of this motivation and its implications that
both commentators and GINA address. Nonetheless, liability probably arises even without this purpose because merely requesting a genetic test, regardless of its purpose, violates the Act. I address the
motivations separately to illustrate this point.
First, although the statute states “‘genetic information’ shall not
145
include information about the . . . age of any individual,” and MLB
seeks only the age of the player, the DNA testing policy would nonetheless fall within the confines of GINA because MLB is requesting
146
genetic information from players to determine age. The definition
of “genetic information” is likely designed to prevent a situation in
which an employer requests an employee’s age and is then accused of
147
impermissibly soliciting genetic information. Here, however, MLB
requests a DNA test. There is a material difference between the use
of age and the use of genetic testing to determine age.
Violations of GINA occur if an employer fails to hire an employee or discriminates against an employee because of genetic in142

Id.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1653.4(b), 1635.8(a) (2011).
144
Id. § 1635.3(f)(2)(viii).
145
Id.
146
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(C) (Supp. II 2008).
147
E.g., Dan Vorhaus, MLB’s Genetic Testing Program at the Plate Again, GENOMICS
LAW REPORT (July 28, 2009), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/
2009/07/28/mlbs-genetic-testing-program-at-the-plate-again/ (suggesting that the
EEOC could decide “that the exclusion of ‘information about the sex or age of any
individual’ from the definition of ‘genetic information’ encompasses genetic tests
designed to ascertain an individual’s age, although that does not appear to me to be
the intent of the exclusion”).
143
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148

formation. An MLB team does not violate this provision of GINA.
It is not refusing to hire employees because of genetic information as
defined by the Act. Instead, it is refusing to hire on the basis of age
fraud. The team’s decision is therefore made on the basis of age, not
genetic information. This would seem to comport with the legislative
purpose of the Act. That is, MLB is not discriminating against prospective players on the basis of information contained within a player’s
genes revealing a chance of a debilitating disease, condition, or disorder. In short, this practice neither falls squarely within the text of
the Act nor is it directly associated with the issues the Act is meant to
address.
Nonetheless, MLB is still requesting a “genetic test,” defined by
149
the Act as being an analysis of human DNA.
Therefore, although
the purpose of the request is merely to establish paternity and age, the
request itself likely still violates the Act. The Act makes such a request
150
by an employer for genetic information unlawful. Thus, the policy
fits within a literal reading of the text. The application of GINA to
this particular situation seems to confirm some fears expressed in the
House committee report and by Burton J. Fishman and the GINE
(Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Employment) Coali151
tion. Although the acquisition of genetic information in this case is
not inadvertent, it does demonstrate that genetic information can be
acquired without being used for discriminatory purposes. Further, if
the purpose of Title II is to protect individuals from discrimination in
employment on the basis of genetic information, then the MLB policy does not violate the “spirit” of the Act even thought it seems to fall
152
literally within the statutory language. Consistent with this concern,
148

§ 2000ff-1(a)(1).
Id. § 2000ff(7)(A).
150
Id. § 2000ff-1(b).
151
The House report expressed concern that Title II was overly broad. H.R. Rep.
No. 110-28, at 66–67 (2007). Specifically, the report noted that restrictions on the
acquisition of genetic information were “sweeping.” Id. at 66. Burton J. Fishman,
speaking on behalf of the GINE Coalition, stated that he wished to limit the bill’s
reach, suggesting “genetic information” should be limited to predictive genetic information. Genetic Nondiscrimination: Hearing on H.R. 498 Before the H. Comm. of Energy
& Commerce, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Burton J. Fishman, Of Counsel,
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Employment Coalition). He stated, “Possession of genetic information must be differentiated from the use of such information for discriminatory purposes.” Id. at 6.
152
See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (“[A] thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892))). But see id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(scolding the majority for ignoring the plain statutory language).
149
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some argue that there is ambiguity in the definitions of “genetic information” and “genetic test” that may make it possible for the EEOC
153
to create regulations so as to enforce GINA against MLB. Currently, as the plain language stands, the mere request for a DNA test—
regardless of the nature of the use of the results—likely violates
GINA.
Certainly, if the motivation behind the policy is to determine the
susceptibility of disease or injury of the prospective players, GINA’s
application is at its zenith. Such a request and use appear to be a
clear and direct violation of the Act. It is unlawful for an employer to
fail to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any employee
154
as a result of the employee’s genetic information. It is also an unlawful employment practice for an employer to request genetic in155
formation from an employee or an employee’s family member.
Therefore, MLB’s policy violates both of the prohibitions set forth in
Title II of GINA, because the MLB team would be both requesting
genetic information and using genetic information (such as a player’s
fifty-percent chance of developing Huntington’s disease) to either
156
refuse to honor a playing contract or to fail to renew such contract.
Furthermore, it is this type of employer misconduct that the statute
157
The purpose is to prevent discrimination
seeks to make unlawful.
on the basis of genetics. Requesting and testing a DNA sample for
predisposition to disease and injury and then making hiring decisions
based on this information is the type of employment practice directly
repulsive to the statute.

153
Dan Vorhaus, MLB Meets GINA, GENOMICS LAW REPORT (July 22, 2009),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/07/22/mlb-meets-gina/.
Vorhaus suggests that because genetic tests used to establish paternity may analyze
only a few genetic markers, such a test might not fit the statutory definition of “genetic test.” Id. Capitalizing off of this ambiguity, the EEOC, he suggests, could essentially regulate against or in favor of the MLB when it clarifies what tests constitute
genetic tests. Id. See also Vorhaus, supra note 147, where Vorhaus again suggests
that the EEOC could exclude from the definition of “genetic test” any test designed
to ascertain the individual’s age.
154
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008).
155
Id. § 2000ff-1(b).
156
But see Ilya Gilman, Implications of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA) on Professional Sports, ILL. BUS. LAW JOURNAL (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.law.uiuc.edu/bljournal/post/2009/11/03/Implications-of-the-GeneticInformation-Nondiscrimination-Act-(GINA)-on-Professional-Sports.aspx (suggesting
that an MLB team could argue that it backed out of a playing contract for a variety of
legal reasons and that it would be difficult to prove that genetic discrimination was a
contributing factor).
157
§ 2000ff(a)(1); Id. § 2000ff(b).

STEVENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/12/2011 9:49 AM

COMMENT

833

A court has yet to interpret GINA or apply it to a specific set of
facts such as the ones present here. It is unclear if any defense might
be available in the MLB scenario. Might a litigant or court successfully draw parallels between GINA and the ADA or Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act? For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides
that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or en158
terprise.” Health is arguably a bona fide occupational qualification
159
necessary to the normal operation of a professional sports team.
From there, an MLB team might argue that a valid defense lies in the
request and use of a DNA sample to determine whether a prospective
player will be able to carry out the necessary duties of his employment. Importantly, however, this type of defense, explicitly provided
in the Civil Rights Act and the ADA, does not appear in GINA, nor
160
was it contemplated anywhere in the legislative history. Some type
of similar defense arguably should be included and is included in
161
some state laws.
In addition to a contemplated statutory defense, a MLB team
might argue a defense grounded in contract law. Although the idea
of requiring DNA tests for prospective international players raises an
ethical red flag, teams would argue that they are justified in protect162
ing themselves from age and identity fraud.
An affirmative false
statement (here, a statement by the player that he is sixteen rather
than twenty-years old) may be fraudulent misrepresentation for which
MLB can legally seek rescission of the contract, especially if age is
163
considered to be a material fact. This situation seemingly puts a va-

158

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text.
160
For the defense provided in Title I of the ADA see 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)
(2006).
161
See discussion infra Part V.
162
Hoynes, supra note 12 (quoting Cleveland Indians Director of Scouting as confessing that “[i]t’s a big enough risk for a team just to sign a young player and try to
make him a professional baseball player. Now you have to figure out if he is who he
says he is and if he’s 3 years older than you think he is.”).
163
Authorities disagree as to whether an affirmative misrepresentation must be of
a material fact. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162, comment c and
id. § 164 (allowing claims of misrepresentation without showing of materiality), with
Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. 1986) (requiring materiality); Rozen v. Greenberg,
886 A.2d 924, 930 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (same); Jablonski v. Rapalje, 788
159
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lid right to rescind a contract at odds with possible GINA violations.
Perhaps there would be a defense in contract if a DNA test were the
only way of protecting against age and identity fraud. For example, a
team would face the prospect of age fraud because any request or requirement of DNA would violate GINA; but if a team were to continue with a DNA test anyway, it might later seek contract rescission due
to fraud and use this judgment to justify the test. This argument fails,
however, because a DNA test is not the only way to determine age.
Good old-fashioned detective work paired with a bone scan can produce the same result as a DNA test. Ultimately, while a contract defense is probably predictable and likely even successful, GINA
presents a separate issue, and liability under GINA is independent of
any contract claim.
V. STATE LAWS ADDRESSING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
GINA sets the floor for genetic discrimination statutes and does
164
not preempt those state laws with greater protections. Beginning in
the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, state legislators began to
react to court decisions concerning employment discrimination
165
against applicants with sickle-cell anemia. But the state laws vary in
166
content and differ in application. On one end of the spectrum are
laws that specifically target discrimination of genetic traits associated
167
with a particular race. For example, sickle-cell anemia is predominant in African-Americans, whereas Tay-Sach’s disease is prominent
168
in certain Jewish populations.
On the other end of the spectrum
are more comprehensive laws that prohibit any outright genetic dis169
crimination in employment.
As of 2008, thirty-six states provide
170
genetic discrimination protection in the employment context. Any
N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (same); Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales
Co., 699 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. 2005) (same).
164
“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the rights or protections of
an individual under any other Federal or State statute that provides equal or greater
protection to an individual than the rights or protections provided for under this
chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-8(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008).
165
NAT’L. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, GENETIC EMPLOYMENT LAWS (2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/GeneticEmploymentLaws/tabid/1428
0/Default.aspx [hereinafter Genetic Employment Laws].
166
Trumble, supra note 70, at 779.
167
Id.
168
JUDY MONROE PETERSON, SICKLE CELL ANEMIA 6 (2008); ROBERT J. DESNICK AND
MICHAEL M. KABACK, TAY-SACHS DISEASE 233 (2001).
169
Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
189, 193 (1998).
170
GENETIC EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 165.
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genetic discrimination in states without such laws or with laws offering less protection than GINA will be subject to review under GINA.
This includes Ohio, where the Cleveland Indians and Cincinnati
171
Reds are located. Because MLB teams across the country may conduct DNA tests on recruits, the differences in applicable state law
could become very significant.
New York’s genetic-discrimination law, § 296(19) of New York’s
Executive Law, provides that it is unlawful for an employer to “directly or indirectly solicit, require, or administer a genetic test to a person, or solicit or require information from which a predisposing ge172
netic characteristic can be inferred” from an employee or applicant.
But the law allows an employer to require a genetic test where the
genetic information is directly related to the occupational environ173
ment and in which the employee, as a result, could be at danger.
174
The law also allows genetic testing where consent is given.
The limited exception allowing genetic testing where the employee’s health could be at risk as a result of the job is of particular
importance. This “is a likely loophole to the protections of section
296 . . . that allows for the submission of employees to genetic testing
provided that a link is demonstrated between an employee’s suspected genetic anomaly and the dangers of a particular occupational
175
environment.” Paul Trumble argues that had the New York Knicks
subjected Eddy Curry to genetic testing as a condition of employment, the team would have been able to argue that testing for hypertrophic cardiomyopathy is related to his occupational environment,
and that this genetic condition would put him at an increased risk of
176
death as a result of practicing and playing professional basketball.
The New York Yankees, a team that has recently been a victim of age
fraud, might also be able to take advantage of this loophole, using a
similar rationale, if it decides again to request DNA tests. The salient
issue is whether GINA preempts the loophole. GINA offers no similar lawful practice of requesting DNA where a link can be demonstrated between a genetic anomaly and an increased risk of disease in
171

Id.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(19)(a) (McKinney 2009).
173
Id. § 292(19)(b); see Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK.
L. REV. 1237, 1264–65 (1992) (discussing OSHA requirements that employees working around toxic substances be periodically tested to monitor for any effects that the
toxins might have).
174
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(19)(d).
175
Trumble, supra note 70, at 783.
176
Id. at 784–85.
172
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the work environment.
The more stringent protections of GINA
178
might preempt the loophole.
Ultimately, as twelve of the thirty-six states with genetic discrimination laws also are home to MLB franchise teams, the intersection of
state genetic discrimination law and GINA is sure to be an issue. If
requests to international recruits for DNA samples are litigated,
courts will probably find themselves analyzing state law and GINA
side-by-side. Moreover, teams would undoubtedly advocate, perhaps
both in court and in Congress, for the adoption of defenses or loopholes like those in the New York genetic discrimination law.
VII. CONCLUSION
MLB and several franchise teams have encountered an age and
identify fraud problem, specifically involving recruits from the Dominican Republic. Because teams pay high salaries with large bonuses
to young players with significant potential, they go to great lengths to
protect their financial investments in the players. In requiring the
players to prove their ages, teams request DNA tests. DNA testing is
particularly useful because it establishes the paternity of the parents
claimed on the player’s birth certificate, which players often forge in
order to appear younger than they truly are. A DNA test is then essentially a paternity test. Commentators and some scouts, however,
are concerned that the DNA tests are kept and used to determine
whether a player has a predisposition to disease or susceptibility to injury. The league itself has declined to say whether the samples are
being kept.
The use of DNA is particularly controversial because it contains a
wealth of information and its widespread use introduces the potential
for abuse. DNA is a molecule found in the nucleus of all cells, but errors in DNA at birth or mutations acquired during life can cause disease when proteins are not made correctly, are produced excessively,
or are not made at all. While age, is not a characteristic that can be
directly determined by the analysis of DNA, the analysis may shed
light on predisposition for debilitating diseases. In the employment
context, the acquisition and misuse of genetic information has
sparked fears that an applicant’s genetic profile can be discriminatorily used to deny or terminate employment. Employment in professional sports, however, arguably requires health and well-being as legitimate job qualifications. Professional sport employers depend on
177
178

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (Supp. II 2008).
See supra note 164.
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the health of a relatively small number of employees for financial
success.
There exist several potential legal protections against genetic
discrimination. The ADA, although arguably covering genetic discrimination in employment, would probably not offer protection to
prospective baseball players. Although the ADA protects individuals
who are “regarded” as having impairment that substantially limits major life activities, courts and Congress have declined to include genetic predispositions in this definition, and thus the ADA would probably not protect someone regarded as have a genetic predisposition to
disease. Further, despite the fact that the ADA places restrictions on
pre-hiring medical examinations and disability-related inquiries, once
an offer of employment has been made, the employer may condition
that offer on a medical exam under certain conditions.
In contrast, GINA likely makes the MLB DNA testing policy unlawful. It would not matter whether the policy is aimed at preventing
age fraud or whether the samples are kept and tested for predispositions to disease. The Act makes it an unlawful employment practice
to fail to hire an employee because of genetic information or to request or require genetic information from an employee. GINA provides no applicable defenses in this situation, and it is unlikely that a
court of law would consider one. Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and the ADA, GINA has no defense that excludes hiring and firing based on bona fide occupational qualifications. Also, while at
first glance it appears that teams could have a defense in contract law
for fraudulent misrepresentation; this defense is probably dubious
considering that teams have numerous alternatives to DNA testing to
protect themselves against fraud.
State law varies with respect to genetic discrimination. GINA
provides a floor for regulation in this area but does not preempt
states with equal or greater protections. The New York Genetic Discrimination Act makes it an unlawful employment practice to directly
request a genetic test or information that would otherwise provide information about a genetic predisposition. The statute, however, contains a significant loophole: an employer may require a genetic test
where a link can be demonstrated between the employee’s suspected
genetic anomaly and the dangers of the occupational environment.
But as this loophole makes the New York statute less protective than
GINA, MLB might be unable to take advantage of it.
The MLB DNA testing policy certainly appears problematic at
first glance. As it turns out, however, the policy is likely to receive legal scrutiny only under GINA. Furthermore, as the purpose of keep-
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ing and testing DNA samples for susceptibility to disease and injury is
speculative, a court would be left analyzing only the request for DNA
used to determine age. Despite GINA’s exception for age, this practice does fall within a literal reading of the statute. MLB and its franchises should proceed carefully and with an eye towards the message
that the policy presents to the public. An expensive and controversial
DNA test is probably not needed, as alternatives such as bone scans
and detective work can just as efficiently protect against age fraud.
When investigating players like Damian Arredondo, the MLB could
avoid the bioethics concerns and potential legal issues by simply hiring a private investigator.
Americans seem fearful about the misuse of genetic information.
We cannot escape the truths that lie in our genetic profiles. This is
most pertinent for professional athletes who, in part, are successful
because of the talent that can only come from extraordinary genes.
Nonetheless, all would rather be judged for who they are, not on
what some genetic test predicts they might become.
It did not matter how much I lied on my resume. My real resume
was in my cells. Why should anybody invest all that money to train
me when there were a thousand other applicants with a far clean179
er profile?

179

GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997) (explaining the requirements of a prestigious career, Ethan Hawke’s character “Vincent,” is pessimistic that he qualifies).

